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Interdependent Complex Consumer 

Residential Choice And The Oval Of Cassini 

Aharon Hibshoosh, (E-mail: rhibshoosh@gmail.com), San Jose State University 
ABSTRACT 
This paper follows a theory ofNicosia and Hibshoosh regarding the choice by a social consumer 
unit who is facing conjlicting institutional norms. The paper presents a duo-centric consumer 
residential choice model with special disutility restriction. This restriction captures the 
interdependence and complementary interaction in the effects that proximities to predetermined 
locations of competing institution yield on the disutility function. The properties of the Oval of 
Cassini play a key role in the parsimonious modeling ofthis phenomenon and in the analysis. 
Specifically, we develop a residential consumer choice model where the consumer utility is affected 
by conflicting demands for activities of work and non-work institutions. The consumer unit is 
simultaneously attracted to two predetermined centers of work and non-work, while making its 
residence choice. We trace the consequences of these assumptions for optimal consumer choice of 
residential location, and for the size and price ofproperty, level of a composite good, the level of 
internal conflict, taking into account externalities generated by population growth. The study 
identifies a preference for settling at the edges of a region along its main corridor in a two 
dimensional region. It also indicates a pattern of specifically directed curved regional growth in 
the periphery, with lesser development in the region's center. 
INTRODUCTION 
osts of residing in the Bay Area region and commuting to work and non-work centers are high and their 
implications for industrial and regional planning attract close attention among planners and consumers 
alike. In a complex affluent society, consumers face time pressures as they attempt to perform conflicting 
work and non-work activities that are restricted by dictated norms of competing institutions (Hibshoosh & Nicosia 
(1987). The development of marketing I economic models that recognize explicitly the interactive nature of the 
conflicting factors in the consumer utility would be helpful in development regional policy for land use and 
transportation. 
Typically microeconomics based analytical urban economic models of residential choice and land-use adhere 
to the assumption of a single regional center. This center is assumed as the CBD ((Losch (1954), Burgess(l925), 
Alonzo ( ( 1964),(1970)), Muth (1969), Mills (1972), Chan(2001)). The distance from the CBD center to the location 
of the customer residence represents the traveling distance to work. Non-work activities and locations of 
organizations associated with institutions administering them receive only a secondary attention in these models, and 
subsequently in land use and transportation planning. This often leads to a distorted planning perspective that 
supports mass transit development and dense regional development along few central transportation corridors. This 
comes at the expense of a less decentralized peripheral development of highway networks and residential development 
(Nelson, Niles and Hibshoosh (2001)). To provide a more balanced planning perspective, spatial models of residential 
choice for consumers attracted to multiple centers and thus encountering transportation costs to multiple centers have 
been developed. This paper belongs to this stream of research. 
Within this stream of research, e.g, (Papageorgiou and Caseti(l971), Beckmann M.J (1976), Romanos 
(1977), Fujita and Ogawa (1982)), the approach to modeling the poly-center phenomena has been diversified and 
taken by the researchers in different directions reflecting alternate specific focus. However, we are not aware of any 
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modeling in this stream of research that poses an interactive complementary restriction on the proximity arguments of 
the consumer disutility. Instead, scholars have often modeled the utility specification in quite a general form, though 
they often considered the arguments of the spatial structure in the utility. When the general model was exemplified, 
the effects of the proximities to the centers were modeled typically as substitutes (additively) rather than as interacting 
complementarily. In our perspective, this left a substantive and modeling gap that we seek to address in this paper. 
The purpose of the modeling is to enrich the conceptual base for regional planning by taking into account, in 
the utility function, the complex interactive pressure put on the individuals by the conflicting pulling institutions. We 
study the implications for consumer behavior and market evolution and development. What (geographical) patterns 
(continuous and discontinuous) of market evolution and residential choice could be expected? What effects do wealth 
and life style (frequency ofvisiting the different center) have on consumer residential choice? etc. 
THE MODEL 
Conceptually, my modeling approach is based on the following fundamental results reached by Nicosia and 
Hibshoosh in our study of the institutional consumer, Hibshoosh and Nicosia (!987). In an affluent and complex 
society, the consumer is required to participate in variety of social institutions. In tum, the institutions issue 
distinctive norms that to some extent, sanction specific time demanding activities for their members. Examples of 
these institutions are: commercial shopping centers, schools, churches, arts and recreation centers, centers of political 
and community activities, etc. When the consumer unit is composed of several members as is often the case, an 
internal conflict within the consumer unit may naturally rise. The conflict is a result of contradicting commitment 
requirements of the different dominant centers of the different members. These are common cases in a family where 
husband or wife are working in different locations, where one member works and the second shops, and the work and 
shopping centers are located further apart, or where the child's school is located further away from the work place, etc. 
Institutional competition on the consumer's time results in an increased level of internal conflict that strongly affects 
the utility of the consumer unit. This conflict intensifies due to the interactive effect that norms of different 
institutions have on each other in a complex modem society where institutions are no longer relatively autonomous. 
The conflict also intensifies due to the partial replacement of the income constraint by time constraint in an affluent 
society. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the effect of accessibility to the organizations of different 
institutions, on the consumer disutility is also interactive. A distance or physical travel time to a center also represents 
psychological tension and costs that are generated by both a psychological distance that reduces potential intensity of 
activity and thought. A relatively closer proximity to institution may be associated with greater commitment to that 
institution and its norms. The norms of other institutions are competing and often conflicting. Hence, in our opinion, 
a greater degree of realism is obtained in the modeling, by assuming interaction among the proximity arguments in the 
consumer utility. I therefore choose to model the case where the effect ofdistances from the residential location to the 
work place and to centers of non-work activities is complementarily interactive and may be affected by network 
externalities. Hence, the following assumptions: 
AI 	 The region has only several centers common to all consumers. In the case of two centers: the work place ,., .. , 
center and the non-work center. The work center is common to all consumers and it is the main regional 
center (the CBD). The non-work center the (NWC) is also common to all consumers. 
A2 The consumer is a utility maximizer (or as common in spatial models a disutility minimizer). 
A3 Consumer disutility increases as the distance between the consumer residential location and each center 
increases. In the case of two centers, disutility increas~ as the distance between the residential location and 
the "work place" (i.e. the traditional C.B.D center) increases and as the distance between the residential 
location and the non-work center increases. 
A4 	 Reflecting complex consumer behavior, the effect of distances from the different centers is complementary. 
Thus in the case of two centers, the distance between the residential location and the work place center and 
the distance between the residential location and the non-work place center are assumed to be complementary 
factors in their effect on consumer disutility. TheY assume to create an intermediate state variable of conflict 
that consequently affects utility. 
AS 	 A consumer carmot reside in the immediate neighborhood of the centers. The centers are allotted to 
placement of the institutions. There is also a limit as to the maximum physical distance a consumer could 
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reside and still be considerd a resident of the region. (In the marketing literature, the last 10 or 15 percent of 
customers who are furthest away from the retail locations are considered incidental rather than regular 
customers, outside the flnn territory). Adopting this approach, a consumer who is located too far to utilize 
the region1s institutions on a regular basis areJConsidered non-residents. 
A6 The consumer budget is spent on the residence (including "service" cost of home at the chosen location), on 
transportation to the centers of social activity (work and non-work), and on other goods. 
A 7 The transportation cost is proportional to the distance to the centers and is additive 
AS Residence space is not infinitesimal. Hence, in any sub-region only a finite number ofresidents may live. 
AS Regarding the price of land we make one of the following alternative assumptions: 
a. 	
b. 	
The price ofland is inversely related to transportation cost. i.e., it is inversely related to the sum of 
distances from the work center and the non-work center. 
The base price of land is affected by population growth. The base price of land depends only on a 
uniform alternative use cost and transportation cost. However, as population grows, and bids for 
popular sites, the price of land at popular sites increases beyond the base price. The more popular 
the site the greater is the departure from the base price. However, the departure from the base price 
is smooth, with non-popular sites retaining their regular base. 
c. 	 The same arrangement as in b. with an additional possibility that the price of inferior locations drops 
beneath the base price, with a smooth departure that positively relates to site lack of popularity. 
A9 	 There are different consumer types (segments). Here we deal with segmentation based on lifestyle and 
wealth. Lifestyle is to be modeled by the frequency of visiting the center mix, wealth by disposable income. 
AlO 	 An increase in the population has important impacts on center attractiveness due to the development of 
network externalities, and in tum on the pattern ofmarket expansion, region density and cost of land. 
Formal representation of the model is as follows: 
Assume a plane region with two Focal points Fl and F2 representing centers of non-work activity and of 
work activity, respectively. The region is represented as a geometric plane. With a rectangular coordinate system, 
(X,Y), the location of each consumer's actual or potential residence is represented as a point (x,y) in (X,Y). The 
center of the region is the origin (0,0) and the focal centers Fl and F2 are located 2a units apart, equally distanced 
from the center's region, with coordinates (-a,O) and (O,a), respectively. 
Every consumer unit in the region (typically a potential or actual household) has utility function U, of the 
type U = f(Y, c, W), where the utility is derived from consumption of residential space of size W, from pooled 
proximity to the two centers (measured by an index c), and from Y, consumption of a composite of all other goods. 
The consumer object of choice is the mix of its location (residence), (x,y), together with W andY. As a result, there 
are ultimately four decision variables. We denote the optimal solutions as x*,y*, Y*, W* and k* For (x*,y*), the 
corresponding optimal distances to the centers are dl * and d2* respectively. It is important to notice that for any 
given pair (YA,WA), in the plane (X,Y), the "budget line" is an ellipse, with a fixed kA and the indifference curves are 
Ovals of Cassini with c as an ordering parameter of the family of the indifference curves. In particular, at optimum, 
i.e., at (Y*,W*), we obtain the ellipse with the parameter k*, where k* as a function of (x*,y*) is k*~di * + d2* (in 
the more general case where n centers are present we can easily generalize to k = Edi, i=l, ... , n. in which case we 
obtain an n- ellipse. Further generalizations are similarly easily made.). Similarly, the optimal utility attained is 
evaluated at Y*,W* and c* where c* ~ dl*d2* the optimal oval of Cassini, is equivalent to the optimal indifference 
curve in the plane, (X,Y). 
(In the more general case, we assume n centers and c=Ildi , i =1, ... ,n., thus we obtain the Cassini curve. 
Further generalizations are similarly easily made.) 
Specifically, we assume that the distances di and d2 between the consumer residence and the two focal 
centers affect the utility in an interdependent complementary manner. Specifically, Hence, we assume c = dld2. 
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It should be noted that the effect of c on the utility is negative. It represents a disutility, namely, the higher is 
c the further the consumer is from the focal centers. Hence, we may also refer directly to c as a disutility index DU 
where DU~dld2. 
For ease of exposition, we may further assume that the functional form of U is of the following constant 
elasticity form, 
U =Y"e'W" (l) 

and thus, 

logU = rylogY + 1C loge+ y logW, (2) 

where ~ and y are positive and K is negative. Each consumer unit possesses a budget. The budget constraint is 
assumed as, 
v~Y+ t(dl+d2) + rW (3) 

Where t is a transportation cost per distance unit and r the price (or rent) of residence per unit of land. Initially, we 

assume that r, the price of residential land at a location (x,y) is a function of the total travel distance, dl+d2, and is 

inversely related to the total distance. 

Formally, 

Pg(dl+d2), (4) 

where g is monotonically declining function in dl+d2. 

ANALYSIS 

Effect of transportation on Demand for Residence Land and Composite of Other Goods: 

To gain insights conveniently, we assume that g is linear in dl+d2. Hence, the budget shape becomes, 
V~Y+ t(d1+d2) + (a-(dl+d2))W~ Y +aW +(t- W)(dl+d2) (5) 
And a- (dl+d2) > m > 0 
Along any given ellipse dl +d2 ~ k, the highest utility the highest consumer utility is obtained by choosing a 
location (x*,y*) that results in the pair of distances dl* and d2* that minimizes c, at c*(k). Hence, along any ellipse, 
given the conditionally optimal residence is selected, the problem becomes that ofmaximizing 
logU = rylogY + 1C loge•(k) + y log W (6) 
Or alternatively, since the second term is fixed, the maximization of 
logu- =rylogY +rlogW (7) 
' 
subject to 

v-~ V- tk~ Y + (a-k)W. (8) 
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The solution to the later problem is, 
Yopt = - 17 -v- = - 17 -(V -tk). (9) 
11+r 11+r 
The further away the consumer unit is from the center, (a higher k), the less resources it has available for 
consumption of other goods, due to increase in the transportation cost. 
And 
w r v- = 11 v- tk (10) 
opt= (77+r)(a-k) (77+r) (a-k) 
The effect of change in the distance as measured by moving to a further located ellipse is determined by the 
sign of the first derivative of optimal W with respect to k. This sign is identical to the sign of 
-t(a- k) +(V -tk) (V -ta) (II)(a- k) 2 (a- k) 2 
The sign depends on the size of the product ta relative to V. If transportation cost is very high and the cost of 
land at center is also very high, a consumer residing further away would acquire smaller housing. This is because 
even further away from the center the cost of housing is still too high and the high cost of transportation reduces 
affordability. If the cost in the center not that high and transportation cost are less prohibitive, the size of housing 
further away from the center would increase. 
Along the same ellipse dl + d2 is a fixed sum, and the budget constraint is linear in Y and W. Because 
t(dl+d2) is constant. 
Consider the case where the level of land purchased is identical, say, a standard three-bedroom residence, W. 
With a fixed W we obtain, 
(V-Y-aW)/(t-W)~dl+d2. 
And from (5) 
V,=t-W 
For a higher income for the same level of consumption of other goods and space, the consumer would be able 
to locate closer to the centers, in the sense that it will be on an ellipse closer to the center, assuming theW> t. i.e., the 
size of the marginal reduction in the rent of residence exceeds the transportation cost. If this is not the case and 
transportation cost exceeds the marginal reduction in the residential rent, the opposite is the case. The consumer unit 
would be able to locate further than the center, a choice that is not feasible at a lower budget. This may help explain 
why less affluent consumers often remain closer to the center, as they cannot afford higher transportation cost. 
Optimal residential location choice 
We begin by observing the shape of the indifference curve for a given levels ofY and W. For a given Y and 
W, a given level U0, ofU is obtained where the product dld2~ C. Geometrically, the loci of the indifference curve for 
U0 in (x,y) is therefore the Oval ofCassini with a parameter C, (Fig. I), The indifference curves are densely ordered. 
For the same level of Y and W, a higher level of utility is identical to a location on an Oval of Cassini closer to the 
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Figure 1 
Consumer Choice: lndiference Disutility Curves for the Oval of Cassini 
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origin. Optimizing means fmding the point(s) (X*,Y*) where the highest oval ofCassini is tangent to the Budget line 
curve from within the Budget line. The first model considered the shape of the budget line is an ellipse. Hence, an 
optimization is identical with finding the location(s) where the Oval of Cassini is tangent to the Budget ellipse that 
circumscribes it. An oval that is circumscribed but not tangent within the cost ellipse cannot be paid for, and an oval 
which intersects the cost ellipse but is not tangent to is not optimal since a closer oval to the origin (in particular the 
tangent one to the ellipse) is attainable. 
We will now prove that the tangency is obtained at (A,O) and (-A,O) where the cost ellipse intersects the 
horizontal axis X. 
Any point on the cost ellipse with parameter k satisfies, 
dl+ d2 = k. (12) 
dl = ~(y 2 +(x-a) 2 ) (13) 
d2 = ~(y 2 +(x+a) 2 ) (14) 
k 2 = (dl + d2) 2 = dl 2 + d2 2 + 2dld2 (15) 
dl 2 +d22 =y' +x2 -2xa+a2 +y2 +2xa+a2 
' 
=2y2 +2x2 +2a 2 • (16) 
Hence, 
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dld2 = .5k2 - y 2 -x2 -a' (17) 
Since k is a fixed minimum, dld2 is obtained where dl 2 + d2 2 is maximized or alternatively, since the 
2parameter a is a constant, where x 2 + y is maximized. 
On an ellipse, 
B 2 x 2 +A 2 y 2 =A2 B 2 	 (18) 
' = B' --x ' 	 (19)y 	 B' 

A' 

and 
' A' -B' ,
x' + y' = B + X 	 (20)A' 
2Since A>B, it follows that x 2 + y is maximized where x is· maximized. Maximum x on the ellipse is 
obtained at x ~A and at x ~-A. i.e., the Oval of Cassini with a minimal c ~ dld2 is tangent to any given ellipse that 
circumscribes it, at the intersection of the ellipse with the horizontal axis, (-A,O) and (A,O). 
The value of the index of the oval ofCassini at optimum is, 
(21) 
and the total travel distance to the focal points of work and non-work activities are, 
Copt =(A-a)+(A+a)=2A 	 (22) 
It then follows that the optimal location is at the edge of the markets. The optimal strategy of the consumer 
unit is to position itself closest to one center and furthest from the second center. So for example, the consumer unit 
would position itself closest to the workplace and furthest from the center of the non-work activity, or vice versa. 
This type of choice is the best strategy for a consumer unit in a complex afiluent society with time constraints. 
(Hibshoosh and Nicosia (1987)). The consumer unit faces interdependent interactive and conflicting institutional 
directives and as a result possesses also interdependent and conflicting utilities or disutilities. By choosing to 
minimize one disutility while maximizing the other, the consumer unit minimizes the interactivity and 
interdependence effects in the conflict and maximizes its overall utility. 
According to this result the customers positioning themselves along east and west of the centers and not in 
the hinterland between them. Affluent customers will be located closer to the centers and poorer ones further away 
from them. 
Furthermore, this market will be a very thin one. There is a disincentive to reside outside of the direct rout 
connecting the two centers. 
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Figure 2 
With an Ellipsoide Budget Line. Consumers shun away from the center 
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Effect of Population Growth 
Although this is an extreme pattern, it does not appear totally unrealistic under the appropriate regional 
development assumptions and has immediate relevant implications for expected regional growth and regional 
development policy. In the early developmental stage of a region with an absence of external forces that introduce 
locational specialization and preferences for the centers, it is likely that all activities of work and non-work activities 
will be with located in a single center. HoWever, locational specializations and preferences may be present for various 
reasons and may lead to two naturally separated centers, in our model of work and non-work activities. In the latter 
case, there will be pressure to link the two centers in a connecting road. The road will reduce travel-time, effective 
"distance" and transportation cost. As a public good it will increase the utility for all customers. The results of our 
model suggests that a proactive development of a horizontal road in the east west direction perhaps even prior to the 
settlement of new residents should be a recommended land use policy. Our conclusions are complementary to Hoyt1S 
(1964) observations. 
To this point, the treatment was constructed on the assumption of sparse population at the iso-cost strip. 
However, as a region grows many consumers are attracted to it; seeking residence. In this case, the higher the number 
of customers flocking to the region, the greater the competition for residential space. 
How should we model this development? We assume that as1Jopulation grows beyond some threshold level, 
relatively attractive locations are bidden up and require premium that is directly related to their attractiveness. Along 
any initial budget ellipse the least attractive points are the central one and the most attractive at the east and south 
edges. 
It is reasonable to assume that for some sufficiently distant ellipse from the center, there is a point, e, 
between the center and the edges where the threshold for gainiflg premium is just met. At any location more central 
than e along the same ellipse, the price of land is invariant and identical to that obtained with zero premium. 
However, from point e to and up to the nearest edge, land is sold at a premium that increases from zero at e to a 
maximum at the edge. As a result of this variable premium, the new budget line differs in part from the initial one 
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which applies where population externality was not substantially present. The change is depicted in figure 3, for the 
eastern side only, for the optimal budget curve for a given population level, where the externality effect is 
substantially manifested. Symmetrically similar changes that take place on the western side are not plotted nor 
discussed for simplicity. The new budget curve is Ulentical with the old one in the center up till points e and e' 
(Symmetric points w and w' on the western side are not plotted). From points e and e' as it is progresses in the 
eastern direction, the new budget line departs from the old one. It is here demonstrated for simplicity and without 
intended loss of generality as the straight segments ek and e'k. This budget line applies for a given YO, WO that 
originally are a combination compatible with the ellipse budget line at a level k. In particular the budget applies for 
the case where Y* and W* are the optimal values of Y, W, in the presence of some level ofpopulation externality. In 
this case the optimal values for x andy are labeled x*and y* and the corresponding ellipse is identified by k* We 
will demonstrate that that the point (x*,y*) is not located on the ellipse section of the budget line. The following 
discussion is for this optimal case. Compared with the old ellipse section of the budget line, the new section on the 
budget line ek is gradually increasing its horizontal gap from the old budget ellipse in the easterly direction, because 
residential properties closer to the strict east west directions are relatively more precious. The gap between the old 
and new line reaches its maximum in the strict eastern direction. Assuming the departure process from the old line is 
smooth, or alternatively that emerging new budget lines are smooth in the sense ofpossessing first derivative, the new 
sections of the budget line are tangent to the old section at points e and e'. 
It also make sense to assume that the more distant is the budget ellipse from the center, the smaller is the 
pressure for location premium, as the associated land is less desired. Hence, at a more distant ellipse, point e is likely 
to be closer to the eastern ellipse edge, and the maximum gap of its new budget line from its eastern edge is expected 
to be smaller. When an ellipse budget line is located sufficiently far from the center, the population increase in the 
region is not significant enough to yield premium for distant properties, and the loci of the budget constraint remained 
invariant. As a result, the relevant budget strip will become more flattened thim that at the initial ellipse. Since the 
edges of the ellipses are the most attractive point their price will be bidden up and the consumer would not be able to 
attain them with the Budget V. Instead, if the consumer would insist on residing along the X axis, the east west 
corridor, while using its old budget, it would have to senle at point, k, far away from edge of the market at J. At k, the 
utility is lower than at J. Notice, J is compatible with Y*,W*, as it is compatible with any pair (Y,W) that has 
originally the same V* We do not claim however that J is the one that will be obtained without population 
externality. In fact it is possible that the increase in the price of land will enhance the consumer to reside on ellipse 
that is further away from the center than the original one without population externality. i.e., the consumer will prefer 
to purchase less land and other goods and incur higher transportation cost as a result of the increase in the price of 
land. This lower amount of budget spent on land and other goods means corresponds under the original prices to a an 
ellipse that is located further away from the origin. Notice, along ek, while (Y*,W*) is fixed, the rental price ofW is 
changing. This is in contrast, with the ellipse section of the budget line, where the price ofW is fixed, depending only 
onk*. 
However, utility maximization will not occur at k, but rather at some point G, that is internal to ek. This is 
because ellipses and ovals of Cassini cannot be tangent to each other at any point except for points at the strict eastern 
(or western) direction. Hence, the Oval of Cassini intersects and does not tangent to the old ellipse budget line at 
pointe, as point e is not located in the strict east west direction. Since the new and old budget lines are tangent at e by 
the assumption of smooth changes in the budget line, tangency of the consumer indifference curve with the new 
budget line is impossible at e. Instead, the tangency at point G must be located to the right of point e. On the other 
hand the slope at point k of the segment ek is strictly negative, as more easterly properties command higher premium. 
Since the slope of any Oval of Cassini at any strictly eastern direction is infinite, an Oval ofCassini cannot be tangent 
to the new budget line at point k. Hence, the new consumer optimum at point G must be internal to the segment ek. 
The consumer optimal choice will be not to be located at the strict easterly direction, but rather to locate in a more 
peripheral and less extreme eastern position. Observe the following illustration (Fig.3). The initial budget V is 
vl~ll.S and an initial optimum is obtained at J with DU~J7.6. However due to land bidding the budget constraint 
changes flattened and now EKE' replaces EJE' at a level of v=oll,5. A location k is feasible, but not optimal. The 
disutility oflocating at k is higher than at G. G is optimal with disutility ofDU~21.5. 
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Figure 3 
Thickening the Settlement as Bidding takes Place 

Optimal residence at G rather than J 

6 
-4 
-6LL_______L______~------~------~------l_______u 
~ 4 ~ 0 2 4 6 
X 
Journal ofBusiness & Economics Research -August 1006 Volume 4. Number 8 
We can conclude that as population grows the region is filled and thickens from the central edges AA' 
toward the central periphery, rather than toward the region's center. 
How does the center get filled? Notice that that the settlement of the center is much less attractive due to 
institutional conflict. Hence, it would require either serious a reduction in price of land or a very high increase in 
alternative land in the region. The pattern suggests that it is possible that there will be divergence. Instead of settling 
in the center the consumer will decide to move to the periphery leaving the center relatively less populated with lower 
price value for land and with population who cannot afford a higher transportation cost. If this population is also ofa 
lower socioeconomic class the center may continue to remain unattractive with lower property and land values. 
Notice however, that as population grows there is a greater pressure to filling the center. 
Effect of differential preferences 
Consumers differ in their locational preferences with some preferring a closer proximity to the work place 
rather than to the non-work place centers, and vice versa. We examined the effect by assuming interactive disutility 
with distinctive elasticities for proximities to the work center and the non-work center. Formally, we considered the 
following disutility model, 
(23) 
Although this form resembles a regular constant elasticity model of disutility, it is distinctively different, because of 
specific interdependency between d! and d2. 
In terms of the coordinates of the residential location, the disutilfty is, 
a p 

2
DU=((x-a}2 + y ) 2 *((x+a} 2 + y 2 )2 (24) 
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When a~J3, we have the case we analyzed so fat with equal preference for a proximity to the work place and 
non-work place. A consumer with a>J3 prefers proximity to the work place more than he prefers proximity to the non 
work place, and vice versa for a consumer with a<J3. In general, the map of the indifference curves of DU is similar 
to the one obtained in the case where a~J3, the maps <1f the Ovals of Cassini. In general, the indifference curve is a 
topological transformation of the symmetric indifference curve to a non-symmetric one, with a bloated segment 
around the preferred focal point (center), and a sltrinking region around the less preferred focal point, Fig. 4). 
Interestingly, the most important feature of the optimal location remains invariant when the budget strip is an 
ellipse. It remains the strictly East or West edge of the matket. Except that in the non-symmetric case the consumer 
unit will settle only in the edge closer to its preferred center. The analysis where bidding takes place is also similar. 
There is however some additional important difference. The map of the indifference curves shifts away from 
the non- preferred focal center toward the preferred focal center. As the bloated region around the focal point 
indicates, once bidding begins, a customer with a preference for proximity for a particular focal center (either work or 
non-work center), will be more ready to move to the periphery atound that focal center rather than horizontally toward 
the region center (the origin). If most consumers shate the same tendency, the trend toward thickening the settlement 
in the periphery atound the preferred focal center will be expedited on the expense of filling the center of the region. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our results indicate that conflict among institutions demand may have important implications for consumer 
residential choice. According to our results a consumer will prefer to reside at the edge of the market in order to 
minimize disutility. This is a solution where ideally a consumer prefers a pure choice-being located closer either to 
the work center or to the non-work center and deliberately stays away from the region center. Consequently, the 
region center becomes neglected and its development lagging. Given this consumer preference, regional 
transportation planners should be engaged in mass transit along the main directions of the region. This 
recommendation for transportation policy is important because as population in the region grows, price of land along 
the preferred direction is rising and consumers must locate further away. Transportation development along the main 
route will reduce the pressure on the price of land. 
The direction of regional residential development as population grows is also quite revealing. As prices 
along the main route are bidden up, consumers prefer to move to interior locations but away from the center of the 
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region. Consequently, this movement worsens the conditions at the center. It may lead to drop in price ofland in the 
center reduction in the municipalities tax base and inadequate development. This situation may improve however 
when further population growth occurs and the cost of land in the center increases relative to the very far located 
residential alternatives. An increase in transportation cost would have a similar effect. The conclusion is that an 
optimal transportation policy should also focus on the development of a network of peripheral highways as the 
population in the region expands, even at a cost of higher taxes. At the same time regional planners should focus on 
increasing a center's attractiveness perhaps by offering variety of public goods and services at the region's center. 
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